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THE EFFECTIVE USE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
by
Roy W. McDonald*

T

HE assigned topic, by its wording, piqued my curiosity. It suggested that all was not at ease with summary judgment procedure in the Texas state practice. To test this hunch, I wrote each
Texas district judge. Those who replied-and some fifty did-confirmed my doubts. Affirmatively, nearly three fourths of the answers
indicated a generally favorable attitude toward the practice. One
fourth expressed a profound skepticism, and several who favored in
principle were disturbed by abuses in practice. One judge summed
up with the flat statement that he considered such motions "a waste
of time."
In this atmosphere, I doubt the present demand for another review
of the history of summary judgment' or a repetitious gloss on the
provisions of Rule 166-A.' Rather, a bit of candid analysis seems
indicated. Procedure is not excluded from Cardozo's observation that:
"Jurisprudence will be the gainer in the long run by fanning the
fires of mental insurrection instead of smothering them with platitudes."'
This Article will be limited to a discussion of motions for summary judgment which are supported by affidavits or other extrinsic
evidentiary material. My correspondence does not suggest that any
troublesome problems have arisen with motions which merely challenge the opponent's pleading, and hence fall into routine thought
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patterns conditioned by familiarity with special exceptions.' Of the
evidentiary type of motion, I shall advance six factors which (while
not purporting to be exhaustive) appear to contribute to present
uncertainties.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL INERTIA OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR

History teaches that procedural innovations normally do not receive immediate and universal acceptance. This is not unique to the
summary judgment. The omission of a summary judgment provision
in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure of 1940, deplored by commentators,5 in part reflected the inertia to which I refer. The Advisory
Committee which assisted the Supreme Court in formulating the
Rules was cognizant of the long struggle which had preceded the
grant of the rule-making power to the Supreme Court,' and possibly
over-apprehensive that rules departing from accustomed channels
might be rejected. The changes which it recommended, therefore,
were largely confined to areas of glaring need.
Not until 1950 did the summary judgment rule become effective.!
After only eleven years, we need not be apologetic because we still
stumble, and only now are smoothing away some of the rough spots.
We are in the position aptly described by Rebecca West:
The law, like art, is always vainly racing to catch up with experience.

.. . By a gross inappropriateness judges . . . are described always as
sitting; . . . in fact, they run fast as the hands of the clock, reaching

out to the present with one hand, that they may knot it to the past
which they carry in their other hand. There are always lapses in time
when the present and the past are not joined.8
No doubt our younger lawyers, trained in modern law schools,
are more familiar with this motion than some who have been long
at the bar. But we cannot wait. We must do our best today. And if
we are to do that effectively, we must work along lines that will not
bring us into excessive conflict with the tradition of conservatism
" Some trial judges apparently equate all motions for summary judgment with the
erstwhile general demurrer, granting a motion only when fatally defective pleadings remain unamended. This unduly restrictive approach misses the object of the practice. See
4 McDonald, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 17.26.3.
5Suggs & Stumberg, Summary Judgment Procedure, 22 Texas L. Rev. 433 (1944);
Clark, The Texas and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 Texas L. Rev. 4 (1941).
See also Tex. Civ. Jud. Council, 16th Rep. 15, 35 (1944); id., 17th Rep. 19 (1945);
id., 18th Rep. 17 (1946).
6 McDonald, The Background of the Texas Procedural Rules, 19 Texas L. Rev. 229
(1941).

7
T.R. 166-A was promulgated Oct. 12, 1949, effective March 1, 1950. It followed the
form of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (1938) and ignored the amendments of the federal rule
which became effective in 1948.
SWest, Meaning of Treason 63 (1947).
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which from time immemorial has been characteristc of the mass of
the bar.
II.

DISCRIMINATION IN THE SELECTION OF CASES IN -WHICH
TO MOVE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Trial judges are critical at this point in two respects. Some assert
that an excessive number of motions for summary judgment are

filed, often in actions where the procedure is inappropriate; others
indicate that motions are not filed in proper cases, needlessly cluttering the trial docket. Though the criticisms point in opposite directions, the common element is a lack of discrimination.
Selectivity is essential because in only a relatively small minority
of actions will a motion for summary judgment be indicated
We have no statistics from the state courts. Through the courtesy of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, however, we
do have figures covering federal cases disposed of in fiscal 1960.' 0 In
fifty thousand cases terminated in that year, only 1,433 motions for
summary judgment were decided, and only 890 were granted.
Nearly two thirds were granted to defendants.
It must be clear, therefore, that the summary judgment motion is not an all-embracing panacea which will sweep our trial
dockets clear of over-age litigation. In the terms of a hackneyed
metaphor, it is not a blunderbuss; it is a rifle. No motion should
ever be made "just because"; indiscriminately pressing motions
which are not warranted increases both the expense and delay of
litigation. Every motion should represent the outcome of an intellectual exercise in selectivity.
In Texas state courts, selection must be made with recognition of
the state's extraordinary faith in trial by jury. Since 1845 the state
constitution has protected this right in substantially all civil actions,
whether of a legal or an equitable nature. 1 Moreover, this enthusiasm
is almost unrivalled elsewhere in this country."2 And there are
skeptics; one recalls the late Judge Frank's comment: "Many ex9
Bauman, A Rationale of Summary Judgment, 33 Ind. L.J. 467 (1958), points out
that "the more dismal picture of a procedure erroneously invoked in a considerable number
of cases has failed to capture the attention of the commentators."
"°See Appendix to this paper. Olin S. Thiel, Acting Chief, Division of Procedural
Studies and Statistics, Administrative Office of the United States Courts, in a transmittal
letter of March 8, 1961, indicated certain qualifications which affect the precision of the
tabulation. It is based on the reports of the clerks of the United States district courts,
and includes only motions specifically labeled "for summary judgment" (irrespective of
their content) which have been determined by the court.
"1Butte, Early Development of Law and Equity in Texas, 26 Yale L.J. 699 (1917);
Townes, Texas Pleading 61-108 (1913).
sSee Clark, Code Pleading 29 n.71, 96 n.52 (2d ed. 1947) (Georgia and North
Carolina).
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perienced persons believe that of all the possible ways that could be
devised to get at the falsity or truth of testimony, none could be
conceived that would be more ineffective than trial by jury.""
But in deference to our first point-conservatism-we reject the
skeptics. We are enamored with jury trial, and this passion colors
our decisions.
Into a practice thus oriented, the supreme court chose to insert a
rule which purported to make summary judgment available in any
action. But obviously there are some types of cases in which, as a
matter of public policy, summary judgment should not be rendered.
Suits for divorce are perhaps the most conspicuous examples. 4 Such
exceptions excluded, however, the motion may be urged in any
civil action, whether based upon legal or equitable theories, and
whether seeking legal or equitable relief. The facts of the case,
rather than the nature of the controversy, determine the propriety
of summary judgment."
Manifestly, a motion is most likely to succeed where the controversy is relatively uncomplicated. This may be true where the
claim or defense turns on the interpretation or applicability of a
statute. A motion should also be considered where the claim or defense rests upon tangible proof, such as written documents. Here,
there is less latitude for extravagance of affidavits, and correspondingly, a more solid foundation for the judicial conclusion that there
is no genuine issue of fact.
Acuteness is essential in considering the possibility of a motion for
summary judgment in actions sounding in tort. Especially here does
our professional conservatism raise its head. It has been said that
actions "which turn largely on parol evidence and inferences to be
drawn therefrom . . . in their very nature tend, in justice to all
parties, to require the full development of all the facts on a jury
trial, including examination in court of all available witnesses,
whether friendly, impartial, or adverse."'" It has also been asserted
that summary judgment will not:
be awarded where the issue is inherently one for a jury or judge trial,
as generally in instances of intent; exercise of judgment, of discretion,
5

" Frank, Courts on Trial 20 (1949).
"Rea v. Rea, 124 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1954). See Comment, 2 Baylor L. Rev. 320,
322 (1950); Recent Casenote, 14 Sw. L.J. 121, 123 (1960).
" Elias v. Manis, 292 S.W.2d 836 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref.
" Pattison v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 292 S.W.2d 694, 699 (Tex. Civ. App.
1956) error ref. n.r.e. For criticism of this doctrine under the federal rules, see Wright,
Rule 56(e): A Case Study on the Need for Amending the Federal Rules, 69 Harv. L.
Rev. 839, 356 (1956).
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of reasonable care; res ipsa situations; uncertainty; reasonable amount;
unliquidated damages; or the like."
These caveats may be accepted as general rules, but they are not
absolutes. Summary judgment is proper, and frequently is granted,
in tort actions when the showing establishes undisputed facts which
would compel all reasonable men, exercising sound and impartial
judgment, to draw inferences and conclusions which could lead
only to a judgment for the movant. Such judgments have been sustained in cases involving charges of ordinary or gross negligence,
conspiracy, libel, and other torts."
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF A DECISION TO

MoVE

FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A motion for summary judgment should not be advanced unless
counsel has determined the theories on which he will rely; and deems
his position so strong that he is willing fully and comprehensively to

reveal to the court (and his opponent) the evidentiary support for
those theories.
This is an important strategic decision, although it does not imply
that all theories must be advanced on the motion. Of numerous
grounds of recovery or defense, only one may appear sufficiently
incontrovertible to warrant the motion, while others may be reserved for full development should trial be required. But having
chosen the grounds for the motion, "grapple them to thy souls with
hoops of steel," or, in colloquial terms, give them the full treatment.
Trial judges here note two deficiencies:
A. Counsel fail to satisfy the requirements of Rule 166-A. The
concern is the formal sufficiency of the papers; no question of
credibility is involved. Many reported decisions appear in which,
through carelessness, ignorance, or inattention, motions for sum1'Stayton, Notes on Summary Judgment, 13 Tex. B.J. 445, 473 (1950). See also
Recent Casenote, 14 Sw. L.J. 121, 123 (1960). Accord: Alabama Great So. Ry. v. Louisville & N. Ry., 224 F.2d 1, 50 A.L.R.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1955).
" The cited cases sustained judgments for defendants: Quarles v. Traders & Gen. Ins.
Co., 340 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (conspiracy and libel); Haas v. Carrier
Corp., 339 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (damages by fire alleged as resulting from
negligent installation); Morehead v. H. E. Butt Grocery Co., 333 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960) ("slip and fall" case); Easter v. Wallace, 318 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958) error ref. n.r.e. (action for death of person riding in motor vehicle as guest);
Oaxaca v. Lowman, 297 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e. (personal
injury sustained while working for subcontractor of defendant); Saenz v. Lower Rio
Grand Valley Chamber of Commerce, 296 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (libel).
Cases from other jurisdictions are in harmony. Annot., Propriety of granting summary
judgment in case involving issue of gross or wanton negligence, 50 A.L.R.2d 1309 (1956).
In most of the cases cited in this annotation the motion was denied; in a minority, however, it was granted.
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mary judgment fail due to lack of formal support. The requirements
of the rule are simple; there can be no excuse for failing to meet
them. "Supporting and opposing affidavits ...should show affirmatively the affiant's competence to testify to the facts stated .. .[and]
that such facts are personally known to the affiant. . . .The facts
stated must be [so worded that] ...if the testimony were given...
during trial [it would be admissible]."" Thus, hearsay, conclusions,
opinions, and generalizations which would be excluded at the trial
are not sufficient on a motion. It should also be noted that an
acknowledgment is not a verification"0 and that documents or other
tangible evidence must be authenticated to establish evidential admissibility.
B. Counsel fail to anticipate and cover the full range of fact
issues. To avoid this risk in a complex case requires sharp analysis.
The attorney must marshal his evidence in a logical chain to sustain
the ultimate fact propositions essential to his position. Having done
so, he must make an all-out effort to place before the court (by
affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits) the strongest possible demonstration of each of his basic fact propositions.
There can be merit in deliberation. Often the motion must be
deferred until discovery is advanced: until gaps in proof are filled,
corroboration obtained, protection erected against counter-attack.
One judge says: "[S]ummary judgments at times cannot be granted
because facts which could have been easily procured by requests
for admissions and which are essential ...either have been omitted
or the affiant does not have personal knowledge."
In New York there has been considerable discussion of a short
opinion handed down recently in the Southern District Court." In
a private antitrust action, paying damages of $109,000,000 (after
trebling), one defendant moved for summary judgment. The court
concluded that the naming of this defendant "when the complaint
was drawn was based only on suspicion and on a gossamer inference
drawn from the mere sequence of events." The trial judge stated
he would have granted summary judgment but for the "prevailing
strict policy in this circuit." The court adjourned the motion pending completion of pre-trial discovery. At that point, the court will
decide the motion on the record then available.
194 McDonald, op cit. supra note 2, at § 17.26.2. The bracketed revision reflects the
language of Tobin v. Garcia, 159 Tex. 58, 316 S.W.2d 396, 399 (1958), quoted in,
Gaston v. Copeland, 335 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref n.r.e.
2 Lawyers Sur. Corp. v. Sevier, 342 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
1 'Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., Civ. Action 110-223, opinion of March 30, 1961,
not yet reported.
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We may find a giant step forward in a local rule recently promulgated in the United States District Courts for the Southern and
Eastern Districts of New York. These courts handle the heaviest
case loads in the federal judiciary, and have had their difficulties
with fuzzily conceived motions for summary judgment. Effectuating
the ancient counsel of Anaxagoras that "those who have occasion for
a lamp supply it with oil," the judges have supplemented Federal
Rule 56 with a local provision:
Upon any motion for summary judgment . ..there shall be annexed
to the notice of motion a separate, short and concise statement of
the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is
no genuine issue to be tried.
The papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include
a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts as to
which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.
All material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by
the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted
by the statement required to be served by the opposing party."*
In Texas there is authority for similar local rules." If the quoted
rule is enforced, it should impose upon the lawyers a more perceptive
approach to these motions. No lawyer can satisfy the rule unless he
has first determined the theory of his claim or defense. The extrinsic evidence supporting his motion may run to hundreds of
pages, but the annexed statement of basic facts will provide a map
for the judge as he traverses the maze.
IV.

COORDINATION OF SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND

OTHER PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURES
Maximum utility of the summary judgment procedure requires
recognition that it is an integral part of pretrial practice. It is
essentially a pretrial inquiry as to whether any genuine fact issue
exists."4 This suggests three comments:
A. Some judges question the use of such motions to secure the
"evidence" of the other side. While discovery is not the principal
function of motions for summary judgment, incidental enlightenment from their use is not a detriment. One of the purposes of
2' 5
summary judgment "is to force parties to present their causes.
Modern procedure is dedicated to the desirability of broad discovery.
22

General Rules of the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern

Districts of New York, Rule 9(g), effective February 1, 1961.
2 Tex. Rules Civ. Pro. Ann. rule 817.
4 United States v. Seppa, 12 F.R.D. 251 (D. Minn. 1952).
25 United States v. Daubendiek, 25 F.R.D. 50, 56 (N.D. Iowa 1959).
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Our rules contain techniques intended to permit each party to unearth his opponent's position. Depositions may do it, but often at
great cost. In one five month period I spent 52 days taking depositions (with daily copy) in a single case, and discovery had only
started. Interrogatories and production for inspection may gain
enlightenment, usually at less expense. Yet in one case tried in Texas
a few years ago, the plaintiff obtained some 10,000 photostats from
defendants' records, and used only a handful on trial. If a motion
for summary judgment can obtain some or all of the information at
a minimum outlay, that can not be a drawback.
B. Some judges identify cases at the pretrial conference in which
a summary judgment may be proper, and suggest that a motion be
filed. "Naturally," one judge hastens to add, "there is no promise
that [the motion] is certain to be granted." His point is intensely
practical: "I should much rather deal with the legal problems . . . at
that stage of the case than in connection with a motion for an instructed verdict, or later." He can decide with a deliberation which
is impossible under the pressure of trial, when an impatient jury
pants for his charge; and with far less expense than a motion for
judgment non obstante verdicto after trial.
C. Every trial judge should salvage what he can from a motion
which does not dispose of the action. Rule 166-A(d) contemplates
that in such instances the court "shall if practicable ascertain what
material facts exist without substantial controversy." On the trial
these are taken as admitted, thus narrowing the issues that remain.
A recent Texas case illustrates the utility of partial summary
judgment." In complex litigation growing out of performance under
a gas sales contract between a producer and a pipeline, the petition
and the answer posed issues as to fraud in the inception, contract
interpretation, ratable take formula, claimed discrimination in gas
purchases over a period of years, and the validity of arbitration of
the seller's reserves. Weeks might have been consumed in a full trial.
Both parties moved for summary judgment and the plaintiff-buyer's
motion was granted. The Beaumont court affirmed, save for one
issue: it limited the remand to the issue of the amount of gas reserves. The trial of that issue should be relatively short.
If the recent New York rule succeeds, the required enumeration
2"

If later developments warrant relief, the order stating the facts taken as admitted

may be modified: Dyal v. Union Bag-Camp Paper Corp., 263 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1959);
Coffman v. Federal Laboratories, 171 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 913
(1949).
27Deep So. Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Corp., 328 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error
ref. n.r.e.
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of propositions will simplify the judge's task of isolating uncontroverted facts. Once these are determined, it should be an almost
mechanical task to include them in the court's pretrial order.
V.

PREDISPOSITION OF SOME TRIAL JUDGES TO DENY

MOTIONS

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Some trial judges come to a motion for summary judgment reluctantly, predisposed to its denial. As one wrote: "The average judge
approaches one with the feeling that he is going to overrule it as
soon as the movant comes to a period." There seem to be two main
reasons:
A. Some judges believe that the lawyers do not give adequate
help, and so consider excessive the labor necessary to decision. This
calls only for improved proficiency in advocacy. The lawyer can
help by a sound selection of cases in which to move, and by adopting
procedures adequate to provide the court with the benefit of the
counsel's analysis. Even without a local rule, the motion can be
accompanied by a clear statement of the facts asserted to be undisputed and controlling. A memorandum of law will guide the
court to the legal points. Afforded these aids, the judge should find
no undue burden in ruling upon these motions.
B. Some judges have a highly developed fear of reversal. This
dread, not susceptible of mechanical insulation, should be recognized
and examined. For a trial judge, as for a trial lawyer, risk of reversal
is an occupational hazard, for anyone who decides may err. To the
timid, one may commend a passage from "All's Well that Ends Well":
Our remedies oft in ourselves do lie,
Which we ascribe to heaven; the fated sky
Gives us full scope; only doth backward pull
Our slow designs when we ourselves are dull.
But the bruises of a reversed judge cannot be salved with balm
from Shakespeare. As one judge stated: "I have been reversed so
many times on . . . summary judgment that I have concluded the
rule is of no value and am ready to surrender."
This fear (while not groundless) surely is exaggerated. We do
not know what proportion of summary judgments are appealed, but
the percentage, I suspect, must be low. By physical count, we can
ascertain how appeals fare. A mere statistical tabulation, however,
without analysis of individual records, would afford little basis for
inference. One judge has suggested that the number of reversals in
the early years of the practice reflected a lack of understanding of
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the procedure by the bar and the trial courts, which time now is
relieving. Insofar as a count sheds any light, we may note that during
the past year, Texas appellate courts affirmed about sixty per cent
of the summary judgments on which they passed. A few were reversed and rendered, based on errors found in the application of the
law to the undisputed facts, so that a full trial still was unnecessary.
Of those remanded, several would have been reversed with equal
celerity had the same outcome followed a full scale trial. This leaves
about one fifth which were reversed and remanded because of asserted
fact issues which had not been recognized by the trial court.
This last percentage is too large and can be reduced by greater
clarity at both the trial and the appellate levels. The points which I
have already advanced, if adopted locally, should contribute to this.
An aid would be to amend the Rules to require that the trial court,
on granting a summary judgment, file findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is not presently required in either the state"
or federal"9 practice. It has been said, in a Texas case where findings
were filed upon granting a motion, that they "are in no manner
controlling.""0 In determining the motion, however, the trial judge
makes decisions with respect to fact questions. Since he must ascertain
the material fact propositions which are undisputed or conclusively
established, there is no reason why he should not state these. After
a contested non-jury trial, a well drafted set of findings of fact
includes material facts which are beyond dispute as well as findings
on disputed issues." I disagree with the federal treatise which says:
Logically, findings of fact should not be made in disposing of motions
for summary judgment. Findings are appropriate only in deciding
issues of fact."

In the federal courts, aid is available through written opinions. Moreover, federal decisions recognize that a trial judge may make such
findings, and that the clues provided as to the basis of decision may
aid on appeal.3
"SRiemenschneider v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 316 S.W.2d 949

(Tex. Civ. App 1958);

Quarles v. State Bar, 316 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); Rolfe v. Swearingen, 241
S.W.2d 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e.
" Gurley v. Wilson, 239 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Dulansky v. Iowa-Illinois Gas
& Elec. Co., 191 F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1951).
'0 Quarles v. State Bar, 316 S.W.2d 797, 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). Cf. Smith v.
Ellis, 319 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (findings filed by trial court quoted without comment).
" But refusal of findings on facts which are shown by pleading or by undisputed
evidence have been held not to be error. Brumley v. Neeley, 207 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947) error ref. n.r.e.
3a3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 201 (1958).
"aGurley v. Wilson, 239 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1956), citing Filson v. Fountain, 171
F.2d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1948), rev'd on other grounds, 336 U.S. 681 (1949); Lindsey v.
Leavy, 149 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 783 (1946).
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If findings of fact and conclusions of law are required, the parties
must assist the trial judge by filing written proposals. If this were
not done, the added labor imposed on the judge would become
another makeweight against the motion. But given the adoption of
the suggestions previously made for clarification, the drafting of
suggested findings would be a minimal chore. I believe it would be
rewarding.
VI.

APPELLATE DECISIONS FINDING FACT ISSUES WHICH
WERE NOT EVIDENT TO TRIAL JUDGE

One trial judge, writing without inhibition about appellate review,
states:
They go over it with a fine tooth comb to find any possible jury question (no matter how remote) that could possibly be submitted. If they
can find one . . . they reverse the case, saying . . . in effect: "Al-

though you are probably correct, nevertheless you should submit this
remote issue and then if the jury makes a finding with no evidence
•

.

. you should grant a judgment non obstante veredicto."

Here I might take refuge in the caveat of Herodotus, who said:
"I am under obligation to tell you what is reported, but I am not
obliged to believe it." I shall not.
From a pragmatic standpoint, the important fact is that nearly
one third of the answering judges explicitly indicated concern over
reversals. One judge summed up thusly: "As it is, even a scintilla
of evidence makes the rule of no value."
The so-called "scintilla rule," to which the judge referred, usually
is mentioned when a court is deciding whether the evidence at trial
raises an issue, or any issue, for jury determination. To quote a
recent writer:
It is a judicial legend, that there once was a "scintilla rule" under
which a verdict could be directed only when there was literally no
evidence for proponent, but if there ever was such a notion all that

remains of it today is its universal repudiation. 4

On a motion for instructed verdict the trial court accords every
liberality of construction in favor of the adverse party, indulges
every reasonable inference which may be drawn in his favor, and
discards all contradictory evidence favorable to the movant. But
here is the difficulty: if the evidence, so viewed, amounts to no more
than a "scintilla"-"no more than a mere suspicion or speculation
" James, Sufficiency of the Evidence and Jury-Control Devices Available Before Verdict, 47 Va. L. Rev. 218, 219 (1961).

[Vol. 15
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that the fact propositions asserted by the opponent might be true
or that those urged by the movant might be false"--an issue of fact
is not raised. 5 A showing that amounts to no more than a "scintilla"

is regarded as no evidence at all."6
The appellate courts say that on a motion for summary judgment based on evidence, the trial court should apply tests analogous

to those used in resolving a motion for directed verdict." Analogy
is not identity and the situations are not the same. The motion for
directed verdict is urged at a point in the trial when the movant's

showing has been subjected to the ordeal of cross-examination, and
to the illumination of so-called demeanor evidence generated in
testimony given live before the jury. At the summary judgment
stage, there can be no demeanor evidence, and the impact of cross-

examination is dulled when found only in the written transcript of
a deposition.
These differences probably contribute to the admonitory aphorisms
glossed upon Rule 166-A. Neither the motion for instructed verdict
nor the motion for judgment non obstante verdicto has accumulated
such a miasma of verbal reservations. The motion for summary
judgment has been classed as an "extreme remedy"3 and is said to
be a rule to be "cautiously invoked."'" It has been said that '!the
power to pierce the flimsy and transparent factual veil should be
temperately and cautiously used lest abuse reap nullification."4
The decision on a summary judgment motion, therefore, cannot
always track the potential resolution of a motion for directed verdict.
This has been noted recently by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. That court reversed, in a personal injury action, a summary
judgment granted upon the defense of assumption of risk. The court
agreed that ordinarily summary judgment may be viewed as a virtual
forecast of the decision on a motion for instructed verdict. But it
viewed the instant action as one
in which a determination that there is a "reasonable doubt" . . . about
the existence of a genuine controversy does not foreclose a [later]
3'McDonald, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 11.28 and cases cited.

aoTexas Consol. Theatres v. Slaughter, 143 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
3 Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929 (1952); Gardner v. Martin,
336 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Dallas Teachers Credit Union v. Sweeney, 326

S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error dism.; Boucher v. Texas Turnpike Authority,
317 S.W.2d $94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
5Armco Steel Corp. v. Realty Inv. Co., 273 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1960); Warner v.
First Nat'l Bank, 236 F.2d 853, 857 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 927 (1956).
"9La Neve v. Hinkson, 271

S.W.2d 467

(Tex. Civ. App.

1954)

error ref n.r.e.;

Whelan v. State, 252 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); King v. Rubinsky, 241 S.W.2d
2204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).

°Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568, 571 (10th Cir. 1946).
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directed verdict if on the evidence as it is actually and finally adduced
on a trial reasonable minds could not reach a contrary conclusion....
To require a trial which will (or may) end in the very same judgment
S.. which we here reverse may appear to be an unnecessary and wasteful expenditure of precious limited judicial resource. Of course,
[asserts the judge] it is not. 'What it is, is a recognition that at times
the issues may be such that only after the agony of a full-blown
trial may it authoritatively be determined that there was never really
the decisive issue of fact at all.41
This reads smoothly, but to me it suggests the language of a

writer who has a basic distrust of summary judgment. The trial
judges advance firmly the opinion that some appellate courts go too

far. They contend that a mere scintilla of evidence has been accepted
as sufficient, in the minds of some appellate judges (and especially
those who oppose summary judgment on principle) to defeat a
motion. They assert, with justification, that the rule contemplates
a genuine issue of material fact, one which can be maintained and
opposed by substantial evidence." This implies identification of the
issue and an evidentiary situation which rises above suspicion, speculation, or surmise. A definitive appraisal of these complaints would
require an effort of scholarship suitable for a graduate thesis. It
wohld involve a study of the records in appealed cases which is
impossible within the limitations of this Article.
As an illustration of the possibility of ambiguity even in our
highest court, the recent decision of the Supreme Court in James T.
Taylor & Son v. Arlington Independent School Dist. is a case in
point.4 The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant.
The Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court disagreed
with the intermediate court on the law, but sustained the reversal.
The facts were these: the district sued to recover on a bond after
the low bidder declined to execute a construction contract. The
bidder refused to sign because it claimed an error of $100,000 in its
bid. The bidder-defendant's motion for summary judgment was
supported by the deposition of its estimator, corroborated by work
sheets which established the mistake. The Court of Civil Appeals
said, "We believe that the record before us unquestionably shows
that an honest mistake had been made. . . "" It held, however,
41Robbins v. Milner Enterprises, 278 F.2d 492, 496-7 (5th Cir. 1960). Accord:
Armco Steel Corp. v. Realty Inv. Co., 273 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1960). Cf. Rutherford v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 276 F.2d 330 (sth Cir. 1960) (Brown, J., dissenting); Bros, Inc. v.
W. E. Grace Mfg. Co., 261 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1958).
4
Firemen's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Aponaug Mfg. Co., 149 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1945).
" 160 Tex. 617, 335 S.W.2d 371 (1960), noted, 15 Sw. L.J. 344 (1961).
" Arlington Independent School Dist. v. James T. Taylor & Son, 322 S.W.2d 548,
550 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
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that the contractor must show (1) the mistake was not due to
ordinary negligence, and (2) the district knew or had reason to
know of the mistake before accepting the bid. It found fact issues
on both points.
The nine justices of the Supreme Court produced three opinions.
One justice agreed with the Court of Civil Appeals.
Five justices held that the Court of Civil Appeals had erred on
both the negligence and the knowledge holdings. They concluded
that the contractor would be barred from relief only if his carelessness was akin to gross negligence. The reversal was affirmed, however, on the ground that the estimator was an interested witness. The
five justices sent the case back with the admonition that the trial court
guided by the principles herein stated, should determine from the facts
and circumstances under which the mistake was made whether there
is raised such issue of negligence that should be submitted to the jury.
[Emphasis added.]

The other three justices, with jet precision, zeroed in upon this
sentence. Their approach was logical: they concluded that two issues
of fact were raised: first, whether a mistake was made (although
the Court of Civil Appeals had no doubt as to this) ; and secondly,
whether the mistake was caused by negligence rising to a degree
barring recovery. Their criticism was:
As I construe the majority, it says the second issue might be raised
upon the trial. Under the record . . .I think the issue was raised; and
if like evidence be adduced on another trial, the issue should be submitted.
A respectable argument can be made for the contention that the
five judges applied the scintilla rule to defeat the motion. If we do
not accept a surmise or a suspicion or a speculation as sufficient to
warrant submission of an issue to the jury, we should not use the
mere possibility of a fact issue to sustain reversal.
The genesis of the problem lies in the cliche, "Summary judgment
cannot be granted where the slightest doubt remains."45 This seductive phrase flows with insidious fluency from the judicial pen. There
is danger that it may emerge as a solving formula applied with inadequate discrimination." Two questions need to be given answers
sufficiently precise to make them tools of decision at the trial court
" Bliss v. Ft. Worth, 288 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e., quoting
Doehler Metal Furniture Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1945).
46It has been noted that the "slightest doubt" rule has greatly restricted summary

judgment in some jurisdictions. Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 567,
576 (1952).
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level: First, "doubt" as to what? Secondly, do we really, literally,
mean "slightest"?
The "doubt" should be limited to the truth of the material fact
propositions on which the movant relies. The burden is on the movant
to put before the trial court a convincing evidentiary showing,
against the tests applicable to motions for instructed verdict, sustaining the truth of his crucial fact propositions. This burden should
not be whittled away. It accords with "a basic postulate of the
procedural law that [true] issues of fact shall be resolved only after
a trial.""' Given a motion supported by a sufficient showing to escape
the pitfall of questions of credibility which must be resolved by a
jury-given a motion thus supported, the burden shifts to the
opponent to establish plausible reasons for a trial. ' A party resisting
a motion should not be allowed to hold back his evidence and defeat
summary judgment upon the vague contention that at a trial something may turn up.' "The burden rests upon him to meet the moving
party's evidence with a showing of facts, in detail and with precision,
sufficient to raise a [genuine] issue of material fact.""0 "The determination of the existence of such an issue must rest upon something
more tangible than mere speculation."'"
The practice is unduly restricted when a court, despite the strength
of the showing on the motion, denies the motion or reverses because
of "doubt" as to whether at a trial a fact issue may arise from some
presently unforeseen development or some presently unknown evidence. The following quotation from a Texas decision overstates the
burden on the movant:
We are unable to hold that the record shows conclusively it will be
impossible for plaintiffs, on a full hearing, to make issues to go to
the jury on the actionable negligence of the defendants .. .

If that were the norm, it is difficult to visualize a case in which a
Bauman, supra note 9, at 467-68.
Carver v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 277 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1960); Berry v. Atlantic
Coast Line R.R., 273 F.2d 572 (4th Cir. 1960) (action for negligence; judgment for
defendants); Pen-Ken Gas & Oil Corp. v. Warfield Natural Gas Co., 137 F.2d 871 (6th
Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 800 (1944).
' Stafford v. Wilkinson, 157 Tex. 483, 304 S.W.2d 364 (1957), noted, 9 Baylor L.
Rev. 424 (1957); Cunningham v. Securities Inv. Co. of St. Louis, 278 F.2d 600, reh.
denied, 281 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1960); Schneider v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 254 F.2d
827 (2d Cir. 1958); Bruce Constr. Corp. v. United States, 242 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1957);
see Topp-Cola Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 185 F. Supp. 700 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) and cases cited.
S United States v. Daubendiek, 25 F.R.D. 50, 56 (N.D. Iowa 1959), citing, Piantadosi
v. Loew's, 137 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1943); Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469
(2d Cir. 1943); and other cases.
51Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. International Harvester Co., 272 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1959).
. Pattison v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 292 S.W.2d 694, 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)
error ref. n.r.e.
47
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party could sustain such a burden, i.e., establishing conclusively the
impossibility of some issue developing at trial.
In the same family of unfortunate language, we find statements

that summary judgment is improper where, on moving papers which
are uncontradicted, the appellate court is in doubt as to whether
conflicting inferences might be drawn from the undisputed facts."
I am not questioning the doctrine that a motion shall be overruled
when the court can see that there is a fact basis on which reasonable
men could differ as to the ultimate conclusions. What I do contend
is that it seems improper to compel a trial when the opponent has
brought forward no evidence, and when the court cannot conclude
that conflicting inferences would be reasonable; but at the most can
only say that it has doubt as to whether they might be reasonable.
I appreciate that here we also encounter the rule that ordinarily
the truth of the uncorroborated testimony of an interested witness
as to facts favorable to the party with whom he is identified, concerning an issue upon which such party has the burden of proof,
must be left to the jury. 4 The important point is to recognize that
this is a general-not invariable-rule, that it has its limitations, and
that the cry "interested witness" should not become a magic incantation to make motions for summary judgment dissolve in thin air.
We have lived with this doctrine in the field of instructed verdicts,
and we can cohabit with equal felicity at the summary judgment
level. There is no reason why a summary judgment should not be
granted when the support, even though from an interested witness,
"pertains to matters reasonably capable of exact statement, and is
clear, direct, and positive, is internally devoid of inconsistencies and
contradictions, and is uncontradicted either by the testimony of
other witnesses or by circumstances-in short, when there is nothing
to cause any reasonable suspicion of its truth." 5 This is especially
indicated where it is clear that the opposing party has it in his power
to contradict the supporting showing if it be false.
As a minimum, the opponent should be required to come forward
with something that raises a doubt as to the facts advanced by the
interested witness, or which satisfies the court that because of the
5 See Braniff v. Jackson Ave.-Gretna Ferry, Inc., 280 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1960)
(Hutcheson, J., dissenting). Brown, J., for the majority, asserted that "conflicting inferences were open upon the moving papers." The additional reference to "reasonable doubt"
was unnecessary.
5 Barker v. Coastal Builders, 153 Tex. 540, 271 S.W.2d 798 (1954); Flack v. First
Nat'l Bank, 148 Tex. 495, 226 S.W.2d 628 (1950); Simmonds v. St. Louis, B. & M.R.R.,
91 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Com. App. 1936). See Howell, Uncontradicted Party Testimony,
2 Baylor L. Rev. 342 (1950).
553 McDonald, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 11.28.
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nature of the particular action such a showing is impractical. Only
very rarely will an opponent have nothing upon which to rely save
an attack upon the witness' credibility." Indeed, here again Texas
carries its enthusiasm for jury trial beyond that of others:
A majority of the courts . . . have announced . . . the view that it is
not a reasonable thing to say, in general, that a witness has ... testified
falsely, either intentionally or unintentionally, merely because of an
interest in the case, where his testimony is not contradicted, is not
opposed to general human experience, is not inherently improbable, and
not put in question by other circumstances appearing in the case . . ..
And finally, how slight is the "slightest doubt"? This question
skirts the edge of metaphysics, and the answer given by a particular

judge is swayed by many factors within his personal philosophy. Thus
we find the sharp cleavage which existed on the Court of Appeals of
the Second Circuit between Judges Jerome Frank and Charles Clark.
Without mentioning individuals, I sense a somewhat similar conflict
of approach developing today on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit, and on at least one of the Texas Courts of Civil Appeals.
At the trial court level, one district judge says: "We . . . never grant
[a summary judgment] . . . unless it is impossible for us to conceive
of some imaginary defense or if there is any doubt whatsoever about
what is in issue."

When any witness undertakes to reconstruct an observed event,
there are many sources of potential error. Among others, the witness
may observe defectively, recall faultily, or testify obscurely. Jurors
or judge may be uncertain in reception or equivocal in the integration of multiple facts. As was stated years ago in the Texas Law
Review:
If a proposition can only be proved probable to some degree, there is
always a slight doubt, never certainty. Thus the test, if logically
applied, would preclude a [summary] judgment in every contested
case. The test must therefore be applied practically and must mean
that the proof offered by the movant must establish his claim or defense with a very high degree of probability.'
6 See Asbill & Snell, Summary

Judgment Under the Federal Rules-When An Issue

Of Fact Is Presented, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 1143, 1154 (1953).
"7Jerke v. Delmont State Bank, 54 S.D. 446, 223 N.W. 585,

591-92 (1929),

citing,

Wigmore, Evidence § 2495 (2d ed. 1923). In this opinion, Massachusetts, Texas, and
Indiana are noted as going far toward barring an instructed verdict for the party having
the burden of proof when the testimony of an interested party is involved. See also James,
supra note 34, at 226, citing an excellent review of the point in Ferdinand v. Agricultural
Ins. Co., 22 N.J. 482, 126 A.2d 323 (1956).
5SBauman, Summary Judgment: The Texas Experience,
(1953). See also Bauman, supra note 9, at 487-88.

31 Texas L. Rev.

866, 872
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"[A]ll proof requires some process of inference, before it can be
translated into an actual decision by the trier.""9 The degree involved
varies from the minimum required on the exhibition of real evidence
to the maximum evoked by the evaluation of circumstantial evidence.
But one thing is certain: there is always room for the "slightest
doubt" as to whether any given testimony-or any fact finding-or
indeed any "fact" stated in an appellate opinion-portrays what
really occurred.
The doubt which will defeat a motion for summary judgment
should be one which rises above surmise, speculation, or suspicion.
It should be grounded on some identifiable basis, such as a conflict
of affidavits, an internal inconsistency in the supporting evidence,
or even a lack of correlation between testimonial assertions and
recognized physical facts. Absent sources of doubt such as these, it
may on occasion arise out of questions as to credibility of the supporting proof, especially where coming from an interested witness
and the party opposing the motion lacks access to the source of
testimony, e.g., where the facts relied upon are peculiarly within the
knowledge of the litigant. But if the summary judgment procedure
is to be effective, the instances where denial is attributed to questions
of credibility must be held to a minimum. Thus we come full scale:
the doubt should rest on more than a scintilla.
When a summary judgment is reversed, the appellate court should
indicate for the guidance of the trial court what issues of fact it has
found. This is not a burdensome obligation; if summary judgment
is to be effective, there should not be a reversal based upon no more
than a vague idea that there are some unidentifiable fact issues in
dispute. The opinion should state specifically what the fact issues
are. While the trial record after remand may differ from the showing on the motion, the trial judge is warranted in asking at least that
he have this much guidance as to the appellate court's reasoning.
VII. CONCLUSION

Through my several comments upon the summary judgment there
runs a single theme which, above all others, will conduce to the more
effective use of this technique. It is the importance of sharp analysis
at each stage of the practice: in the selection of cases; in the preparation of supporting and opposing affidavits; in the judicial appraisal
by the trial court of the showing; and in the appellate review of
motions which have been granted. The summary judgment motion
5oJames, supra note 34, at 219.
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is a precision tool and cannot be handled roughly. It is not an instrument for the clumsy, whether they stand before or sit upon the
bench. In any but the run of the mill cases, it calls for a high degree
of professional application to be successful. Given the attention and
the skill which it deserves, the motion can be a most useful weapon
in the advocate's arsenal.

384
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